In this paper, we show that Markov's principle is not derivable in dependent type theory with natural numbers and one universe. One tentative way to prove this would be to remark that Markov's principle does not hold in a sheaf model of type theory over Cantor space, since Markov's principle does not hold for the generic point of this model. It is however not clear how to interpret the universe in a sheaf model [9, 17, 21] . Instead we design an extension of type theory, which intuitively extends type theory by the addition of a generic point of Cantor space. We then show the consistency of this extension by a normalization argument. Markov's principle does not hold in this extension, and it follows that it cannot be proved in type theory.
Introduction
Markov's principle has a special status in constructive mathematics. One way to formulate this principle is that if it is impossible that a given algorithm does not terminate, then it does terminate. It is equivalent to the fact that if a set of natural number and its complement are both computably enumerable, then this set is decidable. This form is often used in recursivity theory. This principle was first formulated by Markov, who called it "Leningrad's principle", and founded a branch of constructive mathematics around this principle [14] .
This principle is also equivalent to the fact that if a given real number is not equal to 0 then this number is apart from 0 (that is this number is < −r or > r for some rational number r > 0). On this form, it was explicitly refuted by Brouwer in intuitionistic mathematics, who gave an example of a real number (well defined intuitionistically) which is not equal to 0, but also not apart from 0. (The motivation of Brouwer for this example was to show the necessity of using negation in intuitionistic mathematics [4] .) The idea of Brouwer can be represented formally using topological models [19] .
In a neutral approach to mathematics, such as Bishop's [3] , Markov's principle is simply left undecided. We also expect to be able to prove that Markov's principle is not provable in formal system in which we can express Bishop's mathematics. For instance, Kreisel [12] introduced modified realizability to show that Markov's principle is not derivable in the formal system HA ω . Similarly, one would expect that Markov's principle is not derivable in Martin-Löf type theory [15] , but, as far as we know, such a result has not been established yet. 1 We say that a statement A is independent of some formal system if A cannot be derived in that system. A statement in the formal system of Martin-Löf type theory (MLTT) is represented by a closed type. A statement/type A is derivable if it is inhabited by some term t (written MLTT ⊢ t : A). This is the so-called propositions-as-types principle. Correspondingly we say that a statement A (represented as a type) is independent of MLTT if there is no term t such that MLTT ⊢ t : A.
The main result of this paper is to show that Markov's principle is independent of Martin-Löf type theory. 2 The main idea for proving this independence is to follow Brouwer's argument. We want to extend type theory with a "generic" infinite sequence of 0 and 1 and establish that it is both absurd that this generic sequence is never 0, but also that we cannot show that it has to take the value 0. To add such a generic sequence is exactly like adding a Cohen real [5] in forcing extension of set theory. A natural attempt for doing this will be to consider a topological model of type theory (sheaf model over Cantor space), extending the work [19] to type theory. However, while it is well understood how to represent universes in presheaf model [9] , it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to represent universes in sheaf models, as we learnt from works of Chuangjie Xu and Martin Escardo [21] and works of Thomas Streicher [17] . Our approach is here instead a purely syntactical description of a forcing extension of type theory (refining previous work of [7] ), which contains a formal symbol for the generic sequence and a proof that it is absurd that this generic sequence is never 0, together with a normalization theorem, from which we can deduce that we cannot prove that this generic sequence has to take the value 0. Since this formal system is an extension of type theory, the independence of Markov's principle follows.
As stated in [11] , which describes an elegant generalization of this principle in type theory, Markov's principle is an important technical tool for proving termination of computations, and thus can play a crucial role if type theory is extended with general recursion as in [6] .
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the rules of the version of type theory we are considering. This version can be seen as a simplified version of type theory as represented in the system Agda [16] , and in particular, contrary to the work [7] , we allow ηconversion, and we express conversion as judgment. Markov's principle can be formulated in a natural way in this formal system. We describe then the forcing extension of type theory, where we add a Cohen real. For proving normalization, we follow Tait's computability method [18, 15] , but we have to consider an extension of this with a computability relation in order to interpret the conversion judgment. This can be seen as a forcing extension of the technique used in [1] . Using this computability argument, it is then possible to show that we cannot show that the generic sequence has to take the value 0. We end by a refinement of this method, giving a consistent extension of type theory where the negation of Markov's principle is provable 1
Type theory and forcing extension
A dependent type theory is given by: A syntax describing the set objects of discourse, forms of judgments, and rules of inference for deriving valid judgments.
2 Some authors define independence in the stronger sense "A statement is independent of a formal system if neither the statement nor its negation is provable in the system", e.g. [13] . We will establish the independence of Markov's principle in this stronger sense with the help of known results from the literature.
The syntax of our type theory is given by the grammar:
The terms N 0 , N 1 , N 2 , and N will denote , respectively, the empty type, the unit type, the type of booleans, and the type of natural numbers. The term U will denote the universe, i.e. the type of small types. We use the notation n as a short hand for the term S n 0, where S is the successor constructor of natural numbers.
Type system
We describe a type theory with one universe à la Russell, natural numbers, functional extensionality and surjective pairing, hereafter referred to as MLTT. 3 The type theory has the following judgment forms 1.
expresses that Γ is a well-formed contexts, the second that A is a type in the context Γ, and the third that t is a term of type A in the context Γ. The fourth and fifth express type and term equality respectively. Below we outline the inference rules of this type theory. We use the notation F → G for Π(x : F )G when G doesn't depend on F and ¬A for A → N 0 .
Natural numbers:
F For brevity we omitted the rules for the types N 0 and N 1 . The following four rules are admissible in the this type system [1] :
Markov's principle
Markov's principle can be represented in type theory by the type
where IsZero : N 2 → U is defined by IsZero := λy.boolrec (λx.U ) N 1 N 0 y. Note that IsZero (h n) is inhabited when h n = 0 and empty when h n = 1. Thus Σ(x :
The main result of this paper is the following:
◮ Theorem 1.1. There is no term t such that MLTT ⊢ t : MP.
An extension of MLTT is given by introducing new objects, judgment forms and derivation rules. This means in particular that any judgment valid in MLTT is valid in the extension. A consistent extension is one in which the type N 0 is uninhabited.
To show Theorem 1.1 we will form a consistent extension of MLTT with a new consant
Thus MP is not derivable in this extension and consequently not derivable in MLTT.
While this is sufficient to establish independence in the sense of non-derivability of MP. To establish the independence of MP in the stronger sense one also needs to show that ¬MP is not derivable in MLTT. This can achieved by reference to the work of Aczel [2] where it is shown that MLTT extended with ⊢ dne :
By λ abstraction we have ⊢ λh.dne (Σ(x : N ) IsZero (h x)) : MP. We can then conclude that there is no term t such that MLTT ⊢ t : ¬MP.
Finally, we will refine the result of Theorem 1.1 by building a consistent extension of MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
Forcing extension
A condition p is a graph of a partial finite function from N to {0, 1}. We denote by the empty condition. We write p(n) = b when (n, b) ∈ p. We say q extends p (written q p) if p is a subset of q. A condition can be thought of as a compact open in Cantor space 2 N . Two conditions p and q are compatible if p ∪ q is a condition and we write pq for p ∪ q, otherwise they are incompatible. If n / ∈ dom(p) we write p(n, 0) for p∪{(n, 0)} and p(n, 1) for p ∪ {(n, 1)}. We define the notion of partition corresponding to the notion of finite covering of a compact open in Cantor space. ◮ Definition 1.2 (Partition). We write p ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p n to say that p 1 , . . . , p n is a partition of p and we define it as follows: (1) p ⊳ p. (2) If n / ∈ dom(p) and p(n, 0) ⊳ . . . , q i , . . . and p(n, 1) ⊳ . . . , r j , . . . then p ⊳ . . . , q i , . . . , r j , . . . . Note that if p ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p n then p i and p j are incompatible whenever i = j. If moreover q p then q ⊳ . . . , qp j , . . . where p j is compatible with q.
We extend the given type theory by annotating the judgments with conditions, i.e. replacing each judgment Γ ⊢ J in the given type system with a judgment Γ ⊢ p J.
In addition we add the locality rule:
We add a term f for the generic point along with the introduction and conversion rules:
We add a term w and the rule:
Since w inhabits ¬¬(Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x)), our goal is then to show that no term inhabits Σ(x : N ) IsZero(f x). It follows directly from the description of the forcing extension that:
Note that if q p and Γ ⊢ p J then Γ ⊢ q J (monotonicity). A statement A (represented as a closed type) is derivable in this extension if ⊢ t : A for some t, which in turn implies ⊢ p t : A for all p.
Similarly to [7] we can state a conservativity result for this extension. Let ⊢ g : N → N 2 and ⊢ v : ¬¬(Σ(x : N ) IsZero (g x)) be two terms of standard type theory. We say that g is compatible with a condition p if g is such that ⊢ g n = b : N 2 whenever (n, b) ∈ p and ⊢ g n = 0 : N 2 otherwise. We say that v is compatible with a condition p if g is compatible with p and v is given by v := λx.x (n p , 0) where n p is the smallest natural number such that n p / ∈ dom(p). To see that v is well typed, note that by design Γ ⊢ g n p = 0 : N 2 thus Γ ⊢ IsZero (g n p ) = N 1 and Γ ⊢ (n p , 0) : Σ(x : N )IsZero (g x). We have then Γ, x : ¬(Σ(y :
Proof. The proof is by induction on the type system and it is straightforward for all the standard rules. For (f-eval) we have (f n)[g/f, v/w] := g n and since g is compatible with
. For (loc) the statement follows from the observation that when g is compatible with p and p ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p n then g is compatible with exactly one p i for 1 i n.
A Semantics of the forcing extension
In this section we outline a semantics for the forcing extension given in the previous section. We will interpret the judgments of type theory by computability predicates and relations defined by reducibility to computable weak head normal forms.
Reduction rules
We extend the β, ι conversion with f n ⇒ p b whenever (n, b) ∈ p. In order to ease the presentation of the proofs and definitions we introduce evaluation contexts following [20] .
is then the expression resulting from replacing the hole [ ] by e. We reserve the symbols E and C for evaluation contexts. We have the following reduction rules:
Note that we reduce under S. The relation ⇒ is monotone, that is if q p and t ⇒ p u then t ⇒ q u. We will also need to show that the reduction is local, i.e. if p ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p n and t ⇒ pi u then t ⇒ p u. 
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t → q u. If the reduction t → q u has the form f k →(k) then either k / ∈ dom(p) and the statement follows or k ∈ dom(p) and we have t → p u. Alternatively, we have t → u and immediately t → p u. Next we define the relation p ⊢ t ⇒ u : A to mean t ⇒ p u and ⊢ p t = u : A and we write
We define a closure for this relation as follows:
∈ dom(p). We have the following corollaries to Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 2.5. 
From the above we can show that closure ⇒ * is monotone, it is not however local. For a closed term ⊢ p t : A, we say that t has a p-whnf if p ⊢ t ⇒ * u : A and u is in p-whnf. If moreover u is canonical, respectively proper, we say that t has a canonical, respectively proper, p-whnf. Since the reduction relation is deterministic we have 
Computability predicate and relation
We define inductively a forcing relation p A to express that a type A is computable at p. 
2. If p t : A and p u :
2. If p t : A and p u : 
If p t : A and p u :
Using similar arguments we can also show the following two statements: 
Soundness
In this section we show that the type theory described in Section 1 is sound with respect to the semantics described in Section 2. That is, we aim to show that for any judgment J whenever ⊢ p J then p J. Proof. It's direct to see that N → N 2 . For an arbitrary condition p let p n : N . By Lemma 2.23, we have a parition p ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p m where for each i, p i ⊢ n ⇒ * m i : N for some m i ∈ N. We have thus a reduction p i ⊢ f n ⇒ * f m i :
and by definition p i f n : N 2 . If for any j, m j / ∈ dom(p j ) then p j (m j , 0) ⊢ f n ⇒ * fm j ⇒ 0 : N 2 and p j (m j , 1) ⊢ f n ⇒ * fm j ⇒ 1 : N 2 . Thus p j (m j , 0) f n : N 2 and p j (m j , 1) f n : N 2 . By the definition p j f n : N 2 . We thus have that p i f n : N 2 for all i and by local character p f n : N 2 . Similarly we can show p f n 1 = f n 2 : N 2 whenever p n 1 = n 2 : N . Hence ⊢ f : N → N 2 .
◮ Lemma 3.5. If ⊢ p t : ¬A and p A then p t : ¬A iff for all q p there is no term u such that q u : A.
Proof. Let p A and ⊢ p t : ¬A. We have directly that p ¬A. Let p t : ¬A. If q u : A for some q p, then q t u : N 0 which is impossible. Conversely, assume it is the case that for all q p there is no u for which q u : A. Since r a : A and r a = b : A never hold for any r p, the statement "r t a : N 0 whenever r a : A and r t a = t b : N 0 whenever r a = b : A" holds trivially. Let Γ := x 1 : A 1 . . . , x n : A n [x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ] and ρ := a 1 , . . . , a n . We say p ρ : Γ if p a 1 : A, . . . , p a n : A n [a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ]. If moreover σ := b 1 , . . . , b n and p σ : Γ, we say p ρ = σ : Γ if p a 1 = b 1 : A 1 , . . . , p a n = b n : A n [a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ]. Proof. The proof is by induction on the rules of the type system. We show that if the statement holds for the premise of the rule it holds for the conclusion. For economy of presentation we only present the proof for few selected rules. For the rest of the rules the proof follows in a similar fashion. • (natrec-i) While we omit the proof here the basic idea is as follows: If for some r q we have r t : N then by Lemma 2.23, we have r ⊳ r 1 , . . . , r n and for each i, r i ⊢ t ⇒ * S ki 0 for some k i ∈ N. By induction on k i we can show r i (natrec (λx.F ) a 0 g)ρ t : F ρ[t] for all i. By local character we will then have r (natrec (λx.F ) a 0 g)ρ t : where IsZero : N 2 → U is given by IsZero := λy.boolrec (λx.U ) N 1 N 0 y.
◮ Lemma 4.1.
There is no term t such that t : Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x).
Proof. Assume
t : Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x) for some t. We then have t.1 : N and t. 2 : IsZero (f t.1). By Lemma 2.23, one has a partition ⊳ p 1 , . . . , p n where for each i, p i ⊢ t.1 ⇒ * m i for some m i ∈ N. Hence p i ⊢ IsZero (f t.1) ⇒ * IsZero (f m i ) and by Lemma 3.1, p i IsZero (f t.1) = IsZero (f m i ). But, by definition, a partition of must contain a condition, say p j , such that p j (k) = 1 whenever k ∈ dom(p j ) (this holds vacuously for ⊳ ). Assume m j ∈ dom(p j ), then p j ⊢ IsZero (f t.1) ⇒ * IsZero (f m j ) ⇒ * N 0 . By monotonicity, from t. 2 : IsZero (f t.1) we get p j t. 2 : IsZero (f t.1). But p j ⊢ IsZero (f t.1) ⇒ * N 0 thus p j IsZero (f t.1) = N 0 . Hence, by Lemma 2.24, p j t.2 : N 0 which is impossible, thus contradicting our assumption. If on the other hand m j / ∈ dom(p j ) then since p j ⊳ p j (m j , 0), p j (m j , 1) we can apply the above argument with p j (m j , 1) instead of p j .
◮ Lemma 4.2.
There is no term t such that t : MP.
Proof. Assume t : MP for some t. From the definition, whenever g : N → N 2 we have t g : ¬¬(Σ(x : N ) IsZero (g x)) → Σ(x : N ) IsZero (g x). Since by Corollary 3.4, f : N → N 2 we have t f : ¬¬(Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x)) → Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x). Since by Lemma 3.6, w : ¬¬(Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x)) we have, (t f) w : Σ(x : N ) IsZero (f x) which is impossible by Lemma 4.1.
From Theorem 3.8, Lemma 4.2, and Lemma 1.3 we can then conclude:
We have then the following result.
◮ Theorem 4.7. There is a consistent extension of MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
